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Introduction 
 
An effective safeguards program for nuclear materials is dependent on the integration of activities in the 
traditional safeguards elements: physical protection, protective force, and material control and accounting 
(MC&A).    The design and integration of these traditional safeguards elements must be based on a technical 
analysis performed in characterizing the vulnerabilities and related risks of the facility against a designed-
basis threat.   Each of these elements requires a near seamless integration with each other, as well as within 
a site’s operations organization.   
 
One of the key objectives of an effective nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program is 
to address the threat posed by an active or passive “insider” who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt 
protracted or abrupt diversion or theft of special nuclear material (SNM). The function of material 
accountancy is to detect the loss or unauthorized removal of special nuclear material from the plant or 
facility in a timely manner. Detection is accomplished by means of measurements and transfer records of 
material movements and periodic inventories to verify that all material is accounted for. The function of 
material control is to assure the integrity of the nuclear material and the accountancy data.  
 
This paper focuses on the development and implementation of a detailed material control and accounting 
program plan that considers both regulatory compliance demands and performance standards.  
Consideration of both of these demands is necessary to reduce exposure to theft and diversion, to reduce 
regulatory jeopardy, and to minimize to the extent possible adverse impacts with site operations.   
 
Systematic Approach for Implementation of an MC&A System in an Operating Facility 
 
A comprehensive MC&A plan should be developed that provides the design for the MC&A System, the 
basis for procurement of equipment and the development of operating procedures.  The MC&A plan serves 
as a planning document for material control and accounting for review and evaluation of all elements of the 
existing program.  The evaluation should consider the content and status of implementation for existing 
MC&A activities (either stand alone or integrated), the safeguards value of the existing plan 
implementation, and the levels of compliance with regulatory mandates.  Assessment activities should focus 
on the three elements that are required to ensure implementation an integrated and comprehensive plan: 
• Plant Configuration (facility layout, equipment and configuration),  
• People and Resource Application (baseline and required personnel resources and organizations), and 
• Procedural Implementation (documented instructions, operator aids, and procedures that are 
supported by a job task analysis based training program). 
 
Completion of this review, or gap analysis, considering the existing status of the MC&A program and the 
requirements of a fully compliant program will lead to the development of a plan that, when implemented, 
will meet all site and regulatory needs. 
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Following completion of this gap analysis, a path forward to close any deficiencies should be developed and 
reviewed by site management for acceptance and funding, or non-acceptance and a knowledgeable 
assumption of any risks resulting from continuation of the gaps or  deficiencies.  From this point, a revision 
or fresh development of an integrated material control and accounting program plan can be pursued. 
 
Plant Organization 
 
Plant management should establish a central MC&A organization that defines the requirements to meet the 
regulatory mandates applicable to the site.  The organization should have sufficient independence from the 
line/implementing organizations so that it can provide oversight of the implementation of MC&A program.  
 
The MC&A organization should include a dedicated staff, or minimally, matrixed personnel with well 
defined MC&A program responsibilities, that are supported by a cadre of other site personnel with defined 
MC&A responsibilities, to include: 
• Program Management/Administration 
• Accounting 
• Inventory 
• Containment and Surveillance 
• Data Analysis 
• Analytical support personnel (laboratory and statistical) 
• Measurement support personnel (Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive (NDA). 
• Engineering and other technical support personnel interfaces 
• Oversight of Facility Material Balance Area (MBA) Programs 
• Performance Testing of system effectiveness 
 
The site organization provides a centralized material control and accounting function by, but not limited to, 
developing and maintaining a site-wide MC&A Plan, site-level procedures and policies, and providing 
guidance to site organizations in the implementation of MC&A requirements. 
 
The site custodian is the material manager responsible for ensuring full compliance with site and MBA 
procedures pertaining, but not limited to, nuclear material accounting, access control, measurements, 
inventories, transfers into and out of the MBA, and data reporting.  The site custodian serves as the central 
point for authorization of shipments to and from the site and for reporting nuclear material inventory and 
other data submissions to the governmental or national organization. 
 
At the facility level, local MBA custodians must not be responsible for multiple MBA’s for which transfers 
between occur to ensure no comprise of accounting data.  Nor should they have responsibilities for 
performing measurements or handling nuclear material.  There should be a clear boundary in the separation 
of duties between those responsible for accountability and control of the SNM versus those who are 
responsible for the handling of the material.  Local MBA custodians and alternate custodians shall be 
appointed by management of the facility responsible for the MBA where material is located. 
 
Local MBA custodians collect nuclear material measurement data, nuclear material transfer data and 
physical inventory data for the site’s nuclear material accounting system and are responsible for daily 
administrative checks for areas with material movements.  The site and local custodians jointly prepare 
reports required to support physical inventory taking. 
 
An effective MC&A system requires the support of many organizations.  Specialists in the areas of NDA 
and DA are required to perform accountability measurements and support performance of confirmatory 
measurements during nuclear material transfers and during inventory.  Engineering/technical specialists are 
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required to define and provide operational support to MC&A systems such as scales, access control 
equipment and measurement systems.  Maintenance organization(s) are an integral component of ensuring 
reliable operations of MC&A equipment.  In addition, statistical support is needed in preparation for 
physical inventories, analyzing measurement data, and development of quality control charts for 
measurement equipment. 
 
MBA Structure 
 
To facilitate implementation of an effective MC&A system, facility management should consider dividing 
the facility into MBAs.  The structure of MBAs should be based on unit operations and processes to 
establish Key Measurement Points (KMPs) and to identify the location and quantity of SNM in the MBA.  
MC&A procedures are then implemented in each MBA that enables a more manageable system of material 
control and accounting.  Considerations in MBA designations include bulk material or discrete item 
processing, change in nuclear material form or operation, nuclear material transfer methods and frequency, 
method and ease of performing accounting measurements, physical layout, and personnel access.  A primary 
consideration is establishing MBAs when the type of nuclear material changes.  For example, a reactor fuel 
storage area and the reactor should be considered as separate MBAs, considering that reactor operations 
change the isotopic composition of nuclear material in the fuel.  Similarly, when nuclear material changes in 
attractiveness, as a result of processing operations, MBA boundaries should be defined such that the lower 
and higher attractive material are processed in different MBAs.  Likewise, if the nuclear material changes 
form, i.e., bulk liquid material to solid, the MBA boundary may be defined as both a bulk MBA and a solid 
MBA.   
 
An effective MC&A system relies on accurate accountability data prior to transfer of nuclear material to 
another MBA.  Factors that could affect this include methods of transfer into and out of an MBA, ease of 
measurement, type and accuracy of the measurement method(s), and frequency of transfers. 
 
Material Accounting Functions 
 
Another key component of an effective MC&A program is the material accounting functions necessary to 
ensure the inventory of nuclear material is documented and validated to ensure no material has been 
diverted or removed without authorization.   
 
MBA custodians should identify source documents of accounting data and participate in the development of 
transfer records unique to the MBA and type of material.  These could include completed operating 
procedures, log books and measurement data.    
 
The accounting system structure should address the following elements: 
Accounting Structure (Automatic date and record of transactions) 
• MBA reporting defined/authorized locations addressed 
• Multiple material types accounted for (material code/name/weight of reportable element & isotopes) 
• Mixed material type items 
• Attractiveness levels determined for MBAs 
• Material description codes/material form 
• Internal Adjustments reviewed by technical and accounting personnel 
Shipment Receipts 
• Measurement/accounting interface 
• Limits of Error calculated 
• Timely recording and receipt of shipment/receipt data 
MBA Custodian Records 
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• Inventory differences reviews by technical and accounting personnel 
• Inventory reconciliations fully supported and transparent 
• TID records maintained for seal numbers and types 
Accounting/Measurements Interface 
• Data from measurement system is accurate and timely and entered into the system by analytical 
lab/MBA custodian/material accounting 
• Bias corrections coordinated 
 
The accounting system should have the capability to generate reports required for national, site and facility 
needs.  These could include transaction reports, inventory reports, physical inventory reports, and site 
material management reports and documents. 
 
An essential cornerstone in ensuring nuclear material is not stolen or diverted is the performance and 
documentation of the inventory for nuclear material in processing or storage areas.   Facilities should 
develop inventory procedures that define the inventory frequency for MBAs consistent with national and 
agency regulations as well as the performance mechanics of physical inventory taking.  The procedure 
should require multiple-person teams, sampling plans, item count, TID seal and material ID verification and 
confirmation of specific storage locations where discreet items are stored. 
 
MC&A inventory procedures should distinguish between bulk MBAs where nuclear material processing 
occur and item MBAs where nuclear material is stored in containers. For bulk MBA inventories, a semi-
static period of operation is needed where only limited transactions are allowed under controlled conditions 
during the inventory taking. The bulk inventory procedure defines the protocol for release of process tanks 
or groups of tanks for transfer and/or processing once the location and integrity of items verified and all 
required bulk material measurements are validated.  The procedure should include steps to ensure that 
measurement equipment is approved for the application, is calibrated and is within the calibration 
frequency. 
 
The item inventory procedure establishes the timeframe prior to inventory after which there is no item 
movement in to or out of the MBA or sub-MBAs.  The procedure verifies that the measurement equipment 
used is approved for the application and is calibrated within the calibration frequency.  It provides for a 
systematic “walk-through” of the MBA, including all processing and storage areas to include the location 
and identification of items such as waste that are co-located with SNM.  All items/material are recorded and 
verified and waste items containing accountable quantities of nuclear material are inventoried.  It identifies 
items that are accounted for through serial number identification, where TID serial numbers are checked  
containerized materials are verified for container integrity to the extent possible, and verification 
measurements are to be performed, as required, e.g., mass measurement and NDA. 
 
Procedures for reconciliation of the physical inventory involve the comparison of the inventory on record 
(or book inventory) with the results of the physical inventory.  It involves the closing of the material balance 
around each MBA and includes the calculation of Limits-of-Error for Inventory Difference (LEID).  The 
LEIDs provide a method for assessing the significance of the inventory difference between the book 
inventory and physical inventory results. 
 
Material Control Functions 
 
An element of an effective material control program is the implementation of a robust Tamper Indicating 
Device (TID) program.  The function of a TID is to preserve the integrity of the accountancy data, reduce 
the inventory effort and provide for detection of possible diversion.  The primary portions of the TID 
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program are control and application/destruction.  In addition, response procedures should be in place in the 
event anomalies are encountered. 
 
The first step in implementation of a TID program is determination of the type of TID.   Active TID’s (e.g., 
radio-frequency emitting TIDs that provide a signal if the TID is broken) and passive (mylar, multi-lok, e-
cup, lead seal) should be evaluated for the cost and benefit to the program and the integrity, sustainability 
and maintenance of the seal under operating conditions.  All TIDs should have a unique identification 
number dedicated to the site/facility involved and be approved for the specific application. 
 
Appointment of a TID Seal Custodian is a critical aspect of effective control of TIDs.   The TID Seal 
Custodian is responsible for storage and issuance of TIDs that are stored in a secured repository with access 
only by those who are authorized to issue them to users who are documented on the TID users list.  The 
Custodian also ensures TID logs are maintained in a secured repository with access only by authorized 
personnel.  As part of separation of duties, TID issuers should not be authorized to apply/destroy TIDs.   
The TID Seal Custodian ensures that records are maintained that document the receipt, issuance, return, 
transfer, application, and destruction of TIDs assigned to the MBA.   
 
Establishment of a Daily Administrative Check (DAC) program should be considered to provide an 
additional level of assurance that the accountancy records are complete and no nuclear material has been 
stolen or diverted within the facility.   The DAC program looks for abnormalities or obviously missing or 
mislaid items in areas where material is handled or moved. 
 
Implementation of a two-person rule program helps to prevent a single insider from having the opportunity 
to steal or divert nuclear material.  Facility Management must first ensure controls are established to ensure 
members of a two-person rule team have authorization for the category and amount of nuclear material to be 
under their control, are properly trained in the activities they are to perform, are capable of detecting in-
correct or unauthorized action, and have completed two-person rule training.  In addition, controls must also 
be established to ensure that one individual cannot gain access to a secured storage area, and that 
unauthorized or unaccompanied authorized personnel cannot access a storage area undetected. 
 
Procedures should be in place to ensure all waste leaving a Material Access Area (MAA) is monitored.  
Approved methods are to be utilized to monitor waste and/or radioactive material being removed from an 
MAA approved control limits for monitoring methods used to establish and document detection limits for 
all waste and/or radioactive material leaving an MAA. Procedures must also define response actions when 
an out-of-limit condition is encountered, and for investigating all out of limit conditions.  Effective 
monitoring for the removal of waste material containers from an MAA uses a combination of two-person 
rule, TIDs, and NDA scanning as the material exits the MAA. 
 
MC&A Equipment 
 
Equipment used for accountability or verification measurements should be certified for application to the 
nuclear material being measured.  This equipment could be scales for mass measurement, destructive 
analysis equipment and/or non-destructive analysis equipment.  All equipment should be part of the 
maintenance system and have defined calibrations, calibration frequencies, and preventative maintenance 
items as appropriate.  In addition, the equipment should be under a measurement control program to ensure 
the accuracy and precision of measurements. 
 
Analytical equipment used for non-destructive assay and destructive assay measurements should also be 
part of a measurement control program.  This program should consist of the following elements: 
• Standards used should be representative of the material being measured 
• Uncertainty of standards if less than that of the measurement equipment 
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• Standard measurements should be performed every day the equipment is used for accountability 
measurements 
• Use of a method to determine if the measurement equipment is in-control or out-of-control 
• Determination and reporting of random and systematic errors 
• Correction of measurement results are documented and used to account for long term bias of the 
measurement equipment. 
 
Procedures 
 
The effectiveness of an MC&A program is dependent on the development of supporting documentation to 
implement the provisions of the plan.  The documentation, in the form of formal procedures, detailed 
operator instructions, and supporting operator aids serve to ensure that the workers in the field have correct 
and accurate information immediately available to them to ensure compliance with any regulatory and 
operational demands. 
 
The development of implementation procedures is a formalized process that should involve a detailed 
review of the provisions of the plan, and a logical flow down of referenced activities to implementation 
procedures that can be followed by the field personnel.  The procedures may differ significantly in scope, 
and could include site-level procedures, procedures that address cross-cutting activities involving multiple 
activities or operational elements, and detailed operating procedures that directly implement MC&A 
requirements on an activity by activity basis. 
 
In all cases, the formalized procedures should be included in a procedure control or administration program, 
to ensure that procedures are verified in the field for both accuracy and operability, that the procedures are 
subject to both periodic reviews and reviewed when revised, and that an effective procedure distribution 
process is in place to ensure that only the most recently approved procedures are disseminated for use. 
 
Essential to the implementation of the MC&A procedures is the conduct of appropriate knowledge and skill 
based training for the personnel tasked to implement the procedures in the field.  The training, developed 
with the input from a detailed job-task analysis, will consider all provisions of the approved procedures.  
Just as procedures require a walk down in the field, the training should also be reviewed to ensure that all 
tasks are adequately addressed through the training module and can be properly demonstrated in periodic 
performance tests.   
 
Considering the importance of the accurate implementation of the MC&A program, the personnel provided 
training should be subject to both knowledge and skill based evaluations, with well established metrics 
identified to confirm that the trained personnel can in fact implement the plan, consistent with procedures.  
The development and maintenance of procedures, and the training of MC&A staff should be an on-going 
activity under the joint direction of the Site nuclear material manager, the facility MBA custodian and 
facility process operations.      
 
As a site prepares to implement a MC&A program many factors as described above need to be taken into 
consideration.  Based on a technical vulnerability analysis, a thorough understanding of the type, form and 
quantity of nuclear material is foremost in establishing and effective program.  A review of the regulatory 
requirements (site, industry and national) can then be completed which establishes requirements for the 
MC&A program implementation.  Completion of these activities will allow for MBAs and key 
measurement points to be determined, accounting measurement equipment to be obtained, and procedure 
development and personnel training to occur.  Documenting the program’s control and accounting elements 
related to plant (equipment), people (staffing and training) and procedures in an MC&A plan is an effective 
means of defining the structure of the program and describing upgrades and enhancements that may be 
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required. The MC&A Plan provides a single source document that can be used to build assessment criteria 
for evaluating performance as part of routine internal and external assessments.  
 
 
